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Abstract
PURPOSE—A substantial fraction of the observations made by clinicians and entered into patient
records are expressed by means of negation or by using terms which contain negative qualifiers (as
in “absence of pulse” or “surgical procedure not performed”). This seems at first sight to present
problems for ontologies, terminologies and data repositories that adhere to a realist view and thus
reject any reference to putative non-existing entities. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) and Referent
Tracking (RT) are examples of such paradigms. The purpose of the research here described was to
test a proposal to capture negative findings in electronic health record systems based on BFO and
RT.
METHODS—We analysed a series of negative findings encountered in 748 sentences taken from
41 patient charts. We classified the phenomena described in terms of the various top-level categories
and relations defined in BFO, taking into account the role of negation in the corresponding
descriptions. We also studied terms from SNOMED-CT containing one or other form of negation.
We then explored ways to represent the described phenomena by means of the types of
representational units available to realist ontologies such as BFO.
RESULTS—We introduced a new family of ‘lacks’ relations into the OBO Relation Ontology. The
relation lacks_part, for example, defined in terms of the positive relation part_of, holds between a
particular p and a universal U when p has no instance of U as part. Since p and U both exist, assertions
involving ‘lacks_part’ and its cognates meet the requirements of positivity.
CONCLUSION—By expanding the OBO Relation Ontology, we were able to accommodate nearly
all occurrences of negative findings in the sample studied.
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1. Introduction
A substantial part of the observations made by clinicians are entered into patient records as
‘negative findings’, i.e. as statements documenting that something is not the case. Typical
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examples are statements such as ‘no headache’, or ‘no known drug allergies’. Elkin et al found
SNOMED-CT to provide coverage for 14,792 concepts in 41 health records from Johns
Hopkins University, of which 1,823 (12.3%) were identified as negative by human review
[1]. Mutalik et al report the presence of 8,358 instances of UMLS concepts in 60 documents,
of which 571 (6.8%) involved negation [2]. Such negative findings are no less important than
positive ones for accurate medical decision-making, and failure to document pertinent negative
findings may also have medico-legal consequences in connection with claims of malpractice.
In 1998, an NHS Independent Review panel judged the record-keeping in a specific case to
fall below the level of good practice because ‘the notes make no reference to any other findings,
nor of any negative ones which would be relevant when considering problems specific to
diabetes. Thus no reference is made to the absence of a smell of ketones on Miss J’s breath,
nor any other negative indications’ [3]. In the US, Medicare and Medicaid compliance requires
that in the patient record ‘abnormal and relevant negative findings of the examination of the
affected or symptomatic body area(s) or organ system(s) should be documented.’ [4].
Standardized terminologies accordingly contain many terms in which some form of negation
is used. When the January 2006 version of SNOMED-CT is queried for the occurrence of the
word “absence” by means of the Virginia Tech SNOMED CT® Browser [5], for example,
1137 descriptions are retrieved, examples being “absence of scapula”, “absence of breast”, and
so forth. 1336 descriptions are retrieved involving the term ‘absent’, as in “absent leg”, “absent
eyebrow, “bone absent”, “absent skin test reaction”, “absent bone in hand”, “acquired absent
testis”, and so forth.
A similar query for “not” returns 7272 descriptions, including: “not breathing”, “not
constipated”, “not feeling great”, “kidney not palpable”, etc., and for “negative” 1058
descriptions, including: “Joint stress test negative”. The distribution of these descriptions over
the various SNOMED-CT concept categories is illustrated in Table 1.
Terms of this sort do not pose problems of understanding for physicians or nurses: as experts
in biomedicine they are familiar with corresponding specialised usage, and as human beings
they can deal with the intrinsic ambiguities of natural language. For information systems and
software agents, in contrast, such terms cause problems, and they have been shown to be
associated with a number of characteristic errors when used for purposes of automatic
reasoning [6,7]. There are many reasons for this. One is that reasoning systems themselves
involve a logic of negation which does not gell with the uses of negation in standard
terminologies. Second, the treatment of negation in popular computational idioms such as
OWL DL itself involves non-trivial (and sometimes confusingly documented) features which
set traps for inexpert users [8].
A more general reason is that terminologies have thus far been built primarily on the basis of
what is called the concept-based paradigm. This means that terminologies are conceived as
being built not out of terms but rather out of what are called ‘concepts’, in order, it is said, to
abstract away from incidental syntactic features of the former and to focus instead on common
meanings.
Unfortunately the term ‘concept’ is itself thereby used in a variety of conflicting ways, to refer
sometimes to these common meanings, sometimes to entities which are themselves asserted
to have meanings, sometimes to psychological entities (for example to the ideas in the minds
of those who use the corresponding terms), and sometimes to classes or properties or attributes
in reality [9]. As a result of this congeries of interpretations, adequate quality control in concept-
based systems is difficult to achieve [10,11]. This means in turn that most such systems suffer
from idiosyncrasies of various sorts – including, most importantly for our present purposes,
misclassifications of terms containing negation.
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SNOMED-CT, for example, has a large number of ‘concepts’ classified as procedures. We
here leave aside the general issue as to whether it is appropriate to classify procedures as
concepts, and focus instead on the specific problem posed by those cases where the SNOMED
terms involve some form of negation. Examples are “Medication not administered”, “Biopsy
specimen not retrieved”, “Surgical biopsy not taken”, “Metabolic function not tested”, and so
forth. Strikingly, some of these terms are subsumed by terms which would enable us to infer
that they themselves designate procedures. “Metabolic function not tested”, for example, is
subsumed by “Metabolic function test (procedure)”. Of a similar nature is the misclassification
of the term “Topography not applicable” which in SNOMED-CT is taken to be a body region.
As pointed out in [7], such misclassifications reflect in part a confusion of epistemology with
ontology. Facts pertaining to what clinicians know, or do not know, about entities on the side
of the patient are converted by the terminology into entities on the side of the patient. The very
possibility of such conversion is however once again a consequence of the application of the
concept-based paradigm, since the latter provides so little clarity as to the distinction between
the realm of clinicians’ statements (observations, terms, concepts, ideas, knowledge) and the
realm of entities in reality to which such statements would be addressed. Thus in particular it
provides no means to distinguish ontologically between “what is done” and “what is not done”,
since both are of course equally respectable concepts.
Such practices are not acceptable under paradigms that adhere to a view based on unqualified
realism such as Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) [12] and Referent Tracking (RT) [13]. But
because of the importance in biomedicine of our being able to deal with terms that, at first
sight, seem to refer to what does not exist, these systems must be able to give an account of
the meanings of such terms from the realist perspective.
In this paper, we introduce the ‘lacks’ relation to achieve this goal. We first explain the basics
of BFO and RT, and then demonstrate how ‘lacks’ fits into the theory underlying both systems.
1.1. Basic Formal Ontology
BFO is a framework that is designed to serve as basis for the creation of high-quality shared
ontologies in the domain of natural science, and that embraces a methodology which is realist,
fallibilist, perspectivalist, and adequatist [12]. This implies a view according to which: (1)
reality and its constituents exist independently of our (linguistic, conceptual, theoretical,
cultural) representations thereof, (2) our theories and classifications can be subject to revision
motivated by what we discover about this reality, (3) there exists a plurality of alternative,
equally legitimate views on reality, and (4) that these alternative views are not reducible to any
single basic view. It is (1), above all, which is important for us here.
BFO subdivides reality into a number of basic categories. First, it distinguishes particulars
from universals; the former are entities such as: the authors of this paper, the surgical procedure
that the first author underwent when he was 11 years old; the latter are entities such as:
person and appendectomy, which have the former as their instances. Clinical practice and
experimentation relate primarily to the former; scientific theories, which are concerned with
what is general in reality, primarily to the latter.
Second, BFO distinguishes within the realm of particulars between continuants and
occurrents. Continuants are entities – such as the first author of this paper; his dedication to
the use of realist ontology in healthcare information systems – that endure continuously through
a period of time while undergoing changes of various sorts. Occurrents, in contrast, are such
changes; they are entities (otherwise called ‘processes,’ ‘actions’, ‘events’) which unfold over
a certain time through successive temporal parts or phases. However, not all occurrent entities
are segmentable in this way into temporal parts or phases, because there are beginnings and
Ceusters et al. Page 3
Int J Med Inform. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 December 1.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
endings and other boundaries in the realm of occurrents, and the latter are instantaneous: they
are analogous to the edges and surfaces of objects in the realm of continuants. Just as such
spatial boundary-entities can exist only as the boundaries of three-dimensional spatially
extended objects, so temporal boundary-entities can exist only as the boundaries of temporally
extended processes. Typically, the beginning and ending of an occurrent, as well as everything
that takes place between these two points, are parts of the occurrent itself. The beginning and
ceasing to exist of a continuant, in contrast, are not parts of the continuant itself; rather, they
are parts of that occurrent which is its life or history.
Third, there is the distinction between dependent and independent entities, where each
dependent entity is defined as being such that it cannot exist without some independent entity
as its bearer. A dedication towards some goal, for example, cannot exist without a cognitive
being that hosts this dedication. Temperatures, body weights and heights similarly cannot exist
without some material entity in which they inhere.
Fourth, there is the distinction between fiat and bona fide entities, which is based on the
opposition between fiat and bona fide (or physical) boundaries, the latter being exemplified by
boundaries – such as the boundary of Utah, or of the 20th century – introduced via human
demarcation [14]. Bona fide boundaries, in contrast, are parts of brute physical reality, and
exist independently of any demarcations or decisions which we elect to make.
BFO also distinguishes three major families of relations between the entities just sketched: (1)
<p, p>–relations, obtaining between particular and particular (for example: Werner Ceusters
being identical_with the first author of this paper); (2) <p, U>-relations, obtaining between
particulars and universals (for example: Werner Ceusters being an instance_of the universal
person); and (3) <U, U>-relations, obtaining between universal and universal (for example:
scientific paper being a subkind_of artifact) [15]. (We here use italic for relations exclusively
involving universals, and italic for all other relations.)
The importance of this trichotomy is exemplified by the fact that relationships such as parthood
have distinct properties at the particular and at the universal levels. Failure to pay attention to
this has led to a number of erroneous representations of relations crucially important in the
domain of medical care [16].
1.2. Referent Tracking
Referent tracking (RT) is a new paradigm for representing and keeping track of particulars that
has been introduced to support the entry and retrieval of data in electronic health records
(EHRs) [17]. Its purpose is to avoid the ambiguity that arises when statements in an EHR refer
to the patient, or to entities such as disorders, lesions on the side of the patient, exclusively by
means of generic terms from a terminology or ontology.
Suppose, for example, that two physicians are treating the same patient McX, and that each
enters into the EHR a statement to the effect that they observed McX suffering from some
problem Y. On current regimes for data entry into EHRs it is then left unspecified whether the
physicians in question are referring to the same or to different entities on the side of the patient.
Suppose Y is, for example, diabetes. Here only one answer is possible: a patient cannot suffer
from a simultaneous plurality of diabetes, and while humans will likely face no problems should
an EHR fail to conform to this constraint, for software agents programmed to make inferences
from the data such failure will cause problems. Suppose, however, that Y stands in for ‘fracture
of the right tibia’: this failure will cause problems both for software agents and for humans.
The reason is that the physicians in question might have been referring either to the same or
to two different fractures, and in the latter case either to distinct fractures present
simultaneously in different parts of the right tibia of the patient, or to distinct fractures in the
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same spot that have occurred at different times, or to any combination thereof. Referent tracking
avoids such ambiguities by introducing unique identifiers, called IUIs (for ‘Instance Unique
Identifiers’), for each numerically distinct entity that is referred to in statements in a record. It
The paradigm thus represents a radical generalization of current EHR practices, where unique
identification is restricted to independent continuant physical entities such as patients, care
providers, buildings, machines and so forth, in requiring the provision of unique identifiers for
the entire vast variety of clinically salient real-world instances, including fractures, polyps,
seizures, and all those other entities currently referred to in EHRs in ambiguous fashion by
means of general terms alone.
To effectuate this requirement in the concrete form in a Referent Tracking System (RTS)
designed to serve the needs of the healthcare enterprise, we need at least:
(1) a mechanism for generating IUIs that are guaranteed to be unique strings;
(2) a procedure for deciding which particulars should receive IUIs;
(3) protocols for determining whether or not a particular has already been assigned a IUI
(each particular should receive at most one IUI in order to ensure that information
about particulars will exist in integrated form even where it is scattered across a
plurality of information systems);
(4) rules governing the processing of IUIs in information systems in general, including
rules concerning the syntax and semantics of statements containing IUIs;
(5) methods for determining the truth values of propositions that are expressed through
descriptions in which IUIs are employed;
(6) methods for correcting errors in the assignment of IUIs and for investigating the
results of assigning alternative IUIs to problematic cases;
(7) methods for taking account of changes in the reality to which IUIs get assigned, for
example when particulars merge or split;
(8) methods for associating IUIs with general terms from terminologies specifying the
types of entities to which the IUIs have been assigned.
When faced with a statement to the effect that “McX has a fracture of the right tibia”, we would
assign IUIs as follows:
#1 : McX
#2 : the specific fracture to which the statement refers
#3 : McX’s right tibia
The statement itself would then be converted to a conjunction of statements of the forms:
#1 has a #2
#2 instance_of fracture
#3 instance_of right tibia
#3 part_of #1
#21 inheres_in #3
Statements of this sort can easily be written as RDF-triples and are thus able to contribute to
the endeavours of the Semantic Web.
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Ideally, relational expressions such as ‘part_of’, ‘instance_of’, and so on, would then be drawn
from a suitable relation ontology [15]. Terms such as ‘fracture’ and ‘right tibia’ would come
from an ontology faithful to the principles of BFO, so that the terms in question would inherit
their customary meanings. But the referent tracking paradigm allows also the use of terms
drawn from concept systems. Statements such as ‘#3 instance_of right tibia’ would then
signify that, within the linguistic and scientific community in which the given concept system
is used, it is acceptable to use the term ‘right tibia’ to refer to the particular in question.
The proposal to enforce systematic identification of particulars is a novel idea when applied
in the EHR domain; but this idea is itself not new. It has been embraced by scholars in the
domain of computer science, for example in [18], which argues that problems in database
schema integration, schema evolution, and interoperability are precisely the consequence of
the ambiguities brought on by the use of general terms with no adequate attention to the
underlying particulars. At the heart of the problem, according to [18], is the erroneous
assumption adhered to in database design circles according to which entities can be referred
to in every case as instances of pre-specified classes. The authors term this the assumption of
inherent classification and make the case that this assumption violates philosophical and
cognitive guidelines on classification.
1.3. The problem of negative findings
In [17] we have described a formal framework that is able to deal with phenomena in reality
by means of elementary statements of the sorts just described (#1 has a #2, etc.), at the same
time specifying the role to be played by terminologies and ontologies in this framework (Table
2). The problem which confronts us here turns on the fact that referent tracking adheres to the
realist philosophy imposed by BFO. It thus needs to take into account a constraint to the effect
that only entities that exist are to be assigned a IUI. How, then, can it deal with the ‘negative
findings’ or ‘negative observations’ captured in expressions such as: “no history of diabetes”,
“hypertension ruled out”, “absence of metastases in the lung”, and “abortion was prevented”?
Such statements seem at first sight to present a problem for the referent tracking paradigm,
since they imply that there are no entities on the side of the patient to which appropriate unique
identifiers could be assigned.
2. Objectives
If referent tracking is to be accepted as a viable paradigm for EHR management, it has to be
able to deal with phenomena of the mentioned sort. Our objective is thus to expand the set of
statements with which an RTS can currently deal, in such a way as to allow representations of
those portions of reality in which something is not the case without violating the basic principles
of realist ontology [12].
3. Material and methods
We analysed a series of negative findings encountered in 748 sentences drawn from 41 patient
charts from Johns Hopkins University [1]. We assumed such findings to be descriptions of real
phenomena on the side of the patient (including aspects of the patient’s environment). We
classified these phenomena in terms of the various top-level categories and relations defined
in BFO and taking into account the role of negation in the corresponding descriptions. We also
studied terms from SNOMED-CT containing one or other form of negation. We then explored
ways to represent such phenomena by means of the types of representational units available
on the Referent Tracking paradigm.
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4. Results
4.1. Negative findings at the level of particulars
Table 3 lists the four headings under which negative findings can be classified when we take
into account BFO’s distinction between particulars and universals and the types of relationships
that can obtain between them. <U, U>-relations do not belong to the realm of particulars and
are thus excluded from our purview here. The last column of Table 3 shows the distribution of
the occurrence of different types of negative findings in the analysed sample.
On the basis of this analysis, we argue that at least one new relationship needs to be included
in the machinery of BFO, which we define as follows:
p lacks U with respect to r at time t: there obtains a relation between the particular p and
the universal U at time t which is such that p stands to no instance of U in the relationship
r at t
Relations in the lacks family are involved in phenomena that are described by means of
negative findings of types C1 and C3 in Table 3. If, for example, a patient (an independent
continuant particular) does not have a right hand (also an independent continuant particular),
then no instance of the universal right hand is part_of that patient at the given time. For C3-
type phenomena, the relation with respect to which lacks holds, is one of instantiation: if for
a disorder on the side of a patient it is ruled out that it is a primary hyperaldosteronism, then
that disorder (an existing particular) is not an instance_of the universal primary
hyperaldosteronism.
To accommodate this new ontological relation under the referent tracking paradigm, a new
type of tuple is required, which we will call U-, which is a lacks-counterpart of the U-tuple
defined in [17].
The particular referred to by IUIa asserts at time ta
that the relation r of ontology o does not obtain at
time tr between the particular referred to by IUIp and
any of the instances of the universal u at time tr
As an example, if Dr. McY asserts on May 5, 2006 that patient McX lacks his right hand since
a car accident, then a U- statement would be entered into the corresponding Referent Tracking
System in which IUIa is the unique identifier assigned to Dr. McY, ta is a standardised string
representing May 5, 2006, r the parthood relationship, o the ontology in which the parthood
relationship is defined, IUIp the IUI assigned to McX, and tr a standardised string denoting the
time at which the car accident occurred. The U-slot would be filled by the identifier assigned
to the universal right hand in ontology o.
In addition to U-tuples, the RTS defined in [17] contains also A-tuples, which express the
assignment of a IUI to a particular. There is here no need to define an A- tuple (as the lacks-
counterpart of the A-tuple), since referent tracking does not allow the assignment of IUIs to
non-existing entities.
We think there is similarly no need for a lacks-counterpart of other relations between particulars
and would thus accommodate for C4 types of negative findings such as “the patient does not
live in his house anymore” by means of simple logical negation applied to statements about
particulars. Negative findings of type C2 are special cases of C3: there is no universal that
instantiates them at the indicated time tp
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4.2. Negative findings at the level of universals
There are many circumstances under which it would be useful to include in realism-based
ontologies representational units that express some form of negation, primarily findings of
absence. Another application would be to give a realist interpretation to terms found in
terminologies that refer to absences as putative entities.
In line with [15], we can thus define:
C1 lacks C2 with respect to r = [definition] for all c, t if c instance_of C1 at t then c
lacks C2 with respect to r at time t.
Using this relationship, we are able to describe the universal acephalus as being instantiated
by entities that lack a head:
Acephalus lacks Head with respect to has_part.
We can also use this relationship to give a realist interpretation of terms such as ‘head trauma
without loss of consciousness’:
Head Trauma Without Loss Of Consciousness lacks Loss Of Consciousness with respect
to associated_with.
5. Discussion
We based our study on two different sources: sentences found in electronic health records
containing some form of negation, and terms retrieved from SNOMED-CT by querying for
standard negative formulations.
The sentences from the first sample were extracted from the patient charts by natural language
parsing software sensitive to textual clues for negation [1]. Some sentences were returned
erroneously because of misleading textual clues, e.g. ‘The patient actually answers yes, no,
and sir to all questions’. Furthermore, not all sentences containing negation are descriptions
of negative findings, e.g. ‘He has no idea why he is here’. Finally, some sentences described
a ‘positive’ phenomenon in a ‘negative’ way, such as ‘Her workup showed that she had an
MRI of the brain that was negative in 03/02’ (a case in which the clinician actually states that
the MRI is normal). None of these sentences (3.2% of the sample) were included in the analysis.
Where sentences contained modal and intensional operators we extracted for analysis the
proposition to which these operators were applied. Thus for ‘He has no family history of GI
malignancies that I know of ’ we analyzed only the proposition ‘He has no family history of
GI malignancies’. (The reason is that modal and intensional operators require a second-order
treatment whose discussion falls beyond the scope of this paper.) The resultant sentences
accounted for 12.3% of our sample.
5.1. A realism-based typology of negative findings
The two sets of samples together exhibited phenomena expressed by means of negation that
could be classified into four categories.
Category C1—The first and largest category comprises sentences representing the non-
existence of a particular, sentences which can be divided further into
• cases where an independent continuant is absent: the absence of a left hand in some
particular patient as the result of a developmental disorder, the absence of children in
a family marked by reproductive disorders.
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• cases where a dependent continuant is absent: the absence of headache during a
specified time period, the absence of the ability to walk.
• cases where a dependent occurrent is absent: the non-occurrence of a spontaneous
abortion because preventive measures were taken, the absence of tremors.
Such statements are typically registered only when the non-existence in question has clinical
significance, for example because entities of the relevant sorts ought to exist under normal
circumstances (congenital absence of left hand), or because something that is likely to exist
under relevant circumstances, and is thus expected to exist, fails to do so (absence of headache
after serious head trauma). It might, therefore, be necessary to identify two types of cases
involving negative relations – cases of lacks in the strict sense, where there is an implicit “in
the normal case the relation holds” (the entity in question needs the thing it lacks), and a simpler
relation, which we can call is_without. In the latter case, a further distinction can be made
between situations in which only a limited number of particulars of a given sort are without
another particular (e.g. head traumas without headache), or no particulars are associated with
another particular (no invertebrates have a spinal column). Another issue that needs further
inquiry are the different conditions that apply to lacks (and is_without) for occurrents than for
continuants.
Non-existent entities have been a subject of debate in philosophy at least since Parmenides,
whose central thesis is one to the effect that that which is not cannot be thought about or spoken
about, so that to follow what Parmenides calls the ‘way of truth’ is to accept that to think and
to think of something existing are one and the same [19]. Where, more recently, Kant [20] and
Frege [21] held that it was a mistake to suppose that ‘existence’ is a predicate which could be
asserted or not asserted of a given entity – an existing dollar is not a special kind of dollar –
other philosophers such as Meinong embraced the notion of non-existent entities. For purposes
of natural science, however, where we are dealing with entities localized in space and time, it
seems wrong to include among such entities both existents and non-existents. Again: an absent
leg is not a special kind of leg because it is not a kind of entity at all.
The introduction of the ‘lacks’ relation enables us to do justice to negative findings without
stepping beyond the bounds of what exists. This is because ‘lacks’ allows us to perceive
negative phenomena such as absences as a positive relation that holds between some existing
entity and some corresponding universal, an instance of which would exist (ought to exist, is
expected to exist) if it were not absent.
Category C2—The second category pertains to the absence of an entity which did previously
exist in the patient in question. It is exemplified by cases where a patient did have a left hand
up to certain point in time, but then lost it because of a surgical or traumatic amputation. This
case is unproblematic for RT, since an existing particular to which a unique identifier can be
assigned did indeed exist, and the identifier can still be used even after the entity itself has gone
out of existence.
Category C3—The third category involves statements to the effect that an entity is not an
instance of some clinically salient universal. An example is ‘non-smoker’. Although some
terminologies regard constructions of this sort as unproblematic, they are out place in realist
ontologies since there are no corresponding universals on the side of reality. A sentence to the
effect that a particular person is a non-smoker, is, we believe, more correctly to be analysed as
expressing a proposition to the effect that the person in question is not an instance of the class
smoker.
Category C4—Finally, there are cases in which the negative phenomenon is of a sort such
that some entity does not have certain clinically salient properties. Every organism with a heart
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has a heart that beats, and all beating hearts beat at a certain frequency. The frequency may
vary, i.e. it may exhibit different values, over time. Similarly, all human bodies, as long as they
exist, have a certain weight, but this weight may change over time. Properties such as heart
beat frequency and weight are expected to exhibit values that fall within certain ranges. Actual
weights or frequencies may be in the high or low ends of such ranges, and terms have been
constructed that capture succinctly an entity’s property of being in a clinically relevant range,
examples being ‘bradycardia’, ‘tachycardia’, ‘overweight’, and so forth. If such a term is
negated, it does not entail that the patient under scrutiny does not have a heart, nor that it is not
beating, but only that it is not beating within the frequency range referred to by the term.
Importantly, however, it depends on the ontological nature of the property in question whether
any actual value can be inferred from one or other negative proposition of the given sort. For
properties such as ‘being dead’ and ‘being alive’, negation of the former entails the latter, and
vice versa. But if the patient is said not to be bradycardic, this does not mean that his heartbeat
frequency is in the normal range, for tachycardia may still be a valid situation to take into
account.
Some negative findings could be classified in one of the 4 categories of Table 3, yet still describe
phenomena that require logical extensions of the Referent Tracking paradigm. An example is:
‘no other complications of gastro-esophageal reflux disease’. These form part of a larger family
of cases, in which various kinds of numerical and other quantifiers (such as ‘many’ are
involved). ‘Missing finger’, too, is of this type; since for a patient to have a missing finger is
not for him to have no fingers, but rather to have a number of fingers that is smaller than the
norm.
5.2. Coding negative findings in an RTS
If a clinician describes a phenomenon on the side of a specific patient using the phrase ‘absence
of metastases in the lungs’, then this would be registered in a Referent Tracking System using
some coding along the following lines:
in which #2354 would be the IUI of the clinician, ‘2005-12-27-18:40’ the time of the assertion,
contains the inverse of the instance level relation contained_in from the OBO Relation
Ontology [15], #678 the IUI of this particular version of the ontology, #9100 the IUI of that
patient’s lungs, ‘metastasis’ a reference to the universal metastasis, and ‘until
2005-12-27-18:40’ a description of the time-interval during which the lacks relation holds (in
line with the provisions of EN 12338:2005) [22]. By representing this statement in some
adequate logic, now, and by applying to it associated rules of inference, further assertions can
be derived, e.g. that any particular contained in that patient’s lung is not a metastasis, and that
if there is a metastasis contained in some body part of the given patient, then that body part is
not the lung.
6. Conclusion
By introducing the lacks-relation and by introducing the new tuple-type U- whose semantics
is based on lacks, we are able to represent nearly all negative findings that occur in patient
charts while remaining faithful to the principles of unqualified realism. One quite general
implication of our position is indeed that negation lies outside the realm of ontology, but
belongs rather to the domains of logic [23], language [24] and epistemology [25]. Claiming
the opposite would be symptomatic for what Smith called ‘fantology’, i.e. the false belief that
the structures of logic and language (and information models) are mirrors of the structure of
reality [26]. In reality, there is only what there is, and the fact that language allows us to describe
what there is also by alluding to what there is not (and that logic allows us to reason about
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reality in corresponding ways) does not imply that reality is such as to include what does not
exist. For the corresponding negative expressions do not mirror anything in reality, and to
suppose that they do is a confusion of the way language works.
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Table 1
Number of descriptions retrieved for the queries “not”, “negative” and “absence” using the Virginia Tech
SNOMED CT® Browser on the January 2006 version of SNOMED-CT.
Descriptions retrieved
Concept type “absence” “negative” “not”
Anatomical concepts (Body Structure) 55
Attributes 2
Body structure 68 7 21
Clinical findings 3229 503 828
Context Dependent categories 1073 90 122
Events 1328
Morphologies (Body Structure) 10 7 18
Observable entity 2 9
Organism 43 71
Pharmaceutical/biologic product 43
Physical force 2
Physical object 3
Procedure 156 46 4
Qualifier value 137 21 5
Social Context 11
Special concept 1151 250 139
Staging and Scales 6
Substance 4 3
TOTAL 7272 1058 1137
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Table 2
Ontology-related tuple types in Referent Tracking
Tuple type Phenomenon described
Ai = < IUIp, IUIa, tap> Assignment of IUIp to a particular at time tap by the particular referred to by IUIa 
*
Ri = <IUIa, ta, r, o, P, tr> It is asserted by the particular referred to by IUIa at time ta that the relationship r from ontology o obtains
between the particulars referred to by P at time tr
Ui = <IUIa, ta, inst, o, IUIp, u, tr> It is asserted by the particular referred to by IUIa at time ta that the instantiation relation as defined in ontology
o obtains between the particular referred to by IUIp and the universal u at time tr
*
the subscript ‘p’ stands for ‘particular’ and ‘a’ for ‘author’
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Table 3
categories of negative findings from the perspective of BFO
Relation type Type of Negative Finding Examples %
C1– Non-existence of a particular he denies abdominal pain; no alcohol abuse; no
hepatosplenomegaly; ‘he has no children’
95,8
C2– Absence of previously existing particular at
some given later time t
† no muscle pain anymore 0
C3 <p, u> * Particular not being the instance of a class
at some given time t
‘… which ruled out primary hyperaldosteronism’;
‘without any cyanosis’
4,1
C4 <p, p> Particular not being related to another
particular in a specific way at time t
‘this record is not available to me’ 0,1
*
p stands for particular, u for universal
†
theoretical example given for completeness, although none of this sort was found in the sample
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